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CoRPORATioNs-PoLmCAL ACTIVITIES-INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE PRoHrnmNG POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY CORPORATIONS-Defendant corporation, organized to promote the recall of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, was
charged with violating section 346.12 of the Wisconsin statutes, which prohibits corporations doing business in Wisconsin from paying or contributing
any money, etc., to promote or defeat the candidacy of any person for nomination, appointment, or election to any political office. The trial court entered
a forfeiture judgment against the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. The
statutory phrase "doing business" was intended to limit the scope of the prohibition to corporations organized for profit. Corporations, such as the defendant, organized solely for political purposes are not within the prohibition of the act. State v. Joe Must Go Club of Wisconsin, Inc., 270 Wis. 180,
70 N. W. (2d) 681 (1955).
Statutes prohibiting corporations from contributing to political causes
can be found in the majority of the states1 and the federal code.2 Most of
these statutes were enacted at the tum of the century as part of a general

1 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 17, §286; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §43-1508; Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1949) §1159; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 18, §532; Fla. Stat. (1953) §104.091; Ga. Code
Ann. (1936) tit. 22, §22-724; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1949) §29-5712; Iowa Code (1954)
§491-69; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §25-1709; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §123.010; La. Rev.
Stat. (1950) tit 18, §1482; Md. Code Ann. (1951) art 33, §174; Mass. Laws Ann. (1953)
c. 55, §7; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §196.14; Minn. Stat. (1954) §210.20; Miss. Code Ann.
(1944) §2112; 8 Mo. Stat Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §129.070; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1949)
tit 94, §1444; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1930) §2619; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 42,
§17; N.J. Stat Ann. (1940) §§19:34-32, 34-35; 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944)
§671; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1952) §163-196 (14); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 16, §2008; Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3599.03; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 26, §439; Ore. Rev. Stat.
(1953) c. 260, §260.280; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit 25, §3225 (b); S.D. Code (1939)
tit 16, §16-2003; Tenn. Code Ann. (1934) §11340; Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1952) art.
213; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 20, §20-14-21; W.Va. Code (1955) §188; Wis. Stat. (1953)
c. 346, §346.12; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1946) §31-2410.
218 u.s.c. (1952) §610.
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legislative reaction against corporations caused by the fear that large business enterprises would usurp political power.3 The courts have not had too
much difficulty finding these statutes constitutional,4 but their possible
scope has caused more than a little trouble.5 The problem in the principal
case is the interpretation of that part of the statute which prohibits corporations doing business in the state from contributing to political causes.
The Wisconsin court reads the qualifying language "doing business" to include only profit-making corporations. An earlier decision in Minnesota, 6
interpreting a similar statute, said that "doing business" meant the exercise
of the functions for which the corporation was created, thus including
political corporations within the statutory prohibition.7 An interesting
element in the principal case was the effect of section 12.09 (5) of the
Wisconsin statutes. This subsection, which has no counterpart in Minnesota,
requires the publication of all receipts and disbursements made by a corporation organized for political purposes, thus implying consent to such
activity. 8 Since the subsection was passed after section 346.12, the Wisconsin
court said that section 12.09 (5) was a recognition by the legislature that
corporations organized solely for political purposes can engage in political
activities as long as they report these activities. 9 It has been argued that
these problems of interpretation could be solved as easily as was the problem
of the Gordian knot, for the basic question is whether statutes such as sec-

3 Statutes of this type are usually considered part of the Corrupt Practices Act of the
particular jurisdiction. See Bottomley, "Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns," 30
Bost. Univ. L. Rev. 331 (1950).
•
4 See 69 A.L.R. 377 (1930).
5 See 125 A.L.R. 1029 (1940).
6 La Belle v. Hennepin County Bar Assn., 206 Minn. 290, 288 N.W. 788 (1939).
7 Id. at 294. According to the cases collected in 13 WORDS AND PHRASES 126 at 141, 159
(1940), the Minnesota interpretation is the accepted view. Both the Minnesota and Wisconsin courts rationalized their positions on the basis of legislative intent. The Minnesota
court said that, as amended, the prohibition applied to all corporations since the statute
had formerly prohibited only corporations organized for profit. The Wisconsin court
claimed that since an amendment was needed to include co-operative associations within
the prohibition, any other kind of non-profit organization should be excluded unless
specifically covered.
8 Several other state statutes appear to grant political corporations immunity from
the prohibition. E.g.: the New York and Michigan statutes expressly exclude political
corporations from their prohibition; South Dakota prohibits corporations organized for
profit only; Connecticut restricts the prohibition to "private" corporations; Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon expressly state what types of corporations are included, and do not include political corporations; North Dakota prohibits
corporations from contributing to corporations maintained for political purposes, thus
implying that the latter may exist; Delaware restricts the prohibition to insurance corporations; Iowa has the prohibition in a section entitled "Corporations for Pecuniary
Profit."
9 See Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A. (2d) 754 (1946). Whether non-profit
corporations other than those organized for political purposes may be excluded from the
prohibition of the statute is doubtful. Certainly, as far as the principal case is concerned,
any statement to that effect is dictum. Strong arguments why other non-profit corporations should not be excluded may be found in La Belle v. Hennepin County Bar Assn.,
note 6 supra, at 295.
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tion 346.12 should be repealed entirely.10 These statutes have proved extremely difficult to enforce11 and with the seeming dissipation of the public's
fear of large business enterprises, no strong reasons exist for their continuation. Moreover, a law such as section 12.09 (5) of the Wisconsin code,
requi11ng publication of corporate contributions for political purposes,
should sufficiently inform and protect the public. Such a logical and realistic change from prohibition to publication would certainly provide a
more effective control than that existing today.
George Kircos

10 See Bicks and Friedman, "Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 975 (1953).
11 Id. at 995.

